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Qualitative Theory and Chemical
Explanation
Michael Weisberg†‡
Roald Hoffmann and other theorists claim that we ought to use highly idealized
chemical models (“qualitative models”) in order to increase our understanding of chem-
ical phenomena, even though other models are available which make more highly
accurate predictions. I assess this norm by examining one of the tradeoffs faced by
model builders and model users—the tradeoff between precision and generality. After
arguing that this tradeoff obtains in many cases, I discuss how the existence of this
tradeoff can help us defend Hoffmann’s norm for modelling.
1. Qualitative Models in Chemistry. Roald Hoffmann and other chemists
have claimed that highly idealized models are extremely important and
probably indispensable for chemical explanations.1 Such highly idealized
or “qualitative” models are often contrasted with “quantitative” models,
which are more predictively accurate. The distinction between qualitative
and quantitative models is not about the use of numbers; both types of
models can be numerical. Rather it is a distinction resting on degrees of
approximation and idealization. Qualitative models contain more ap-
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of
Pennsylvania, 433 Logan Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104; e-mail: weisberg@
phil.upenn.edu.
‡Many thanks to Michael Friedman, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Robin Hendry, Ben Kerr,
Deena Skolnick, and Michael Strevens for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this and related papers. John Brauman, Marc Feldman, Paul Needham, Joan Rough-
garden, Janet Stemwedel, and Ward Watt also provided helpful comments in conver-
sations about these themes. Most of all I would like to thank Roald Hoffmann who
has been an inspiring mentor and whose reflections on the philosophical aspects of
chemistry stimulated my interest in this topic. This research was partially supported
by a National Science Foundation Pre-Doctoral Fellowship.
1. This argument can be found in Hoffmann 1995, 1998. One of the classic examples
of the use of qualitative models in chemical explanations can be found in Hoffmann’s
joint work with Woodward on pericyclic reactions (Woodward and Hoffmann 1970).
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proximations and are more highly idealized than quantitative models.2
This contrast is especially striking in the literature about molecular and
electronic structure. Increases in computational power have given chemists
the ability to calculate the electronic structure of small- and medium-sized
molecules with incredible accuracy using quantitative models. Theorists
who emphasize the need for qualitative models acknowledge the impor-
tance and achievements of the quantitative modelling tradition, but em-
phasize the continuing need for qualitative models to increase our un-
derstanding of chemical phenomena. Qualitative models of molecular
structure are rarely able to make highly accurate predictions about mo-
lecular geometry; however, they are thought to explain why molecules
have the shapes that they do.
One of the clearest statements of the continuing need for qualitative
models comes from a recent physical organic chemistry textbook. Felix
Carroll writes:
Why then don’t we just talk about high-level theoretical calculations
and ignore the simple theory? We must choose the model that is
sufficiently accurate for our computational purposes, yet still simple
enough that we have some understanding of what the model describes.
Otherwise, the model is a black box, and we have no understanding
of what it does, perhaps even no idea whether the answers it produces
are physically reasonable. (Carroll 1998, 27; my emphasis)
In this passage, Carroll asserts a connection between building qualitative
models and an increase in explanatory power.3
Before we can analyze the connection between idealization and expla-
nation in greater detail, we need to know what Carroll, Hoffmann, and
others mean by “qualitative models” or “simple models.” These expres-
sions refer to a number of things including:
1. literally simpler models (i.e. ones that have fewer parameters in their
descriptions).
2. models with restrictions on the number of causal factors included.
2. Although I will be treating the qualitative/quantiative distinction as a distinction
about kinds of models, there is another way to render it. Hoffmann and his philo-
sophical allies sometimes apply the qualitative/quantiative distinction to the practice
and goals of modelling. For example, Hoffmann has claimed that models he relies on
in his research exemplify “qualitative thinking” about chemical problems. In Weisberg
2003, I discuss the goal version of this distinction in greater detail.
3. Robin Hendry (2004) argues that the use of highly idealized models in chemical
contexts goes back to the earliest days of quantum chemistry. He claims that Coulson
advocated the use of simplified quantum mechanical models in order to generate chem-
ical explanations that were both plausible and chemically intuitive.
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3. models appraised with lower standards of fidelity.
4. imprecise model descriptions.
While each item on this list may play a role in justifying the claim that
qualitative models are necessary for increasing the explanatory power of
chemistry, I will be confining my discussion to the fourth item—precision.
I will argue that sacrificing precision in model descriptions can often add
explanatory depth to the models picked out by these descriptions. The
defense of this thesis has two parts. First I will argue that there is a
tradeoff between precision and generality. I then suggest that generality
is an explanatory virtue. Hence, a more general set of models is a more
explanatory set. Combining these claims generates the conclusion that
imprecise model descriptions can pick out more explanatory sets of
models.
2. Models. Philosophers defending familiar, simple forms of scientific re-
alism have often argued for a two-place relationship between theoretical
representations and the world. These two relata are connected via cor-
respondence or truth; a good representation truthfully describes a target
system in the world. According to these philosophers, understanding the
practice of theorizing in science only requires understanding the structure
of theories and the relationships between theories and the world.
Giere (1988), Cartwright (1983), Lloyd (1994), and other philosophers
have emphasized the inadequacy of this view to capture aspects of modern
theoretical practice. Giere argues that there are not two, but three relevant
relata: models, model descriptions, and the world. My own account of
modeling broadly follows Giere on this point.
Model descriptions describe or pick out models. In the case of mathe-
matical models, model descriptions typically take the form of equations.
This is optional, however, as models can be represented in other ways as
well, such as with pictures, sentences, or computer programs. A single
model description can pick out multiple models, and one model may be
described by multiple descriptions.
Models themselves can be concrete or abstract. Concrete models, such
as model airplanes, are physically constructed. In this paper, however, I
will be discussing abstract or mathematical models. These models consist
of a set of relationships between properties and many show how these
properties change over time. For example, dynamic models of molecular
structure show how molecules stretch, bend, and rotate in time.
Models, both concrete and abstract, need not be related to any target
system in the actual world. It may be theoretically fruitful to study a
model even if it does not describe an actual target system. However,
chemists often build models with the intention of relating them to actual
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target systems. Such models may be used to make predictions about how
these systems will behave and how their component parts give rise to their
behavior. When models relate to target systems, they do so in virtue of
their being similar to these systems in certain respects and degrees (Giere
1988).
For the purposes of this paper, I will describe a very simple example
of a chemical model: the ball and spring model of covalent bonds. This
model can be used to determine the stretching energy of bonds and is
often used in connection with spectroscopy and semi-empirical calcula-
tions of molecular structure.4 Although this model is used to describe the
quantum mechanical phenomenon of covalent bonding, the model itself
is completely classical. It treats a covalent bond as a spring and atoms
as masses at the ends of the spring. In the simplest version which I will
be discussing in this paper, the spring is treated as a harmonic oscillator;
it is an “ideal” spring with no anharmonic character. These features should
make it obvious that the model contains many kinds of idealizations,
although I will only be discussing the ones having to do with precision.
Ball and spring models are described by the following model descrip-
tion:
2E p k (r r ) . (1)stretch b 0
The independent variable in this equation is the distance between the
atoms. It is expressed as the distance between the atoms (r) minus the
equilibrium distance ( ) so that when the bond is at its equilibrium length,r0
the model predicts zero stretching energy.
Equation (1) is an uninstantiated model description, an equation in
which values are not assigned to the parameters. Instantiating a model
description means adding in values for the parameters.5 We can instantiate
the ball and spring model description in various ways by setting the
parameter ( ) to different values. For example:kb
2E p 1.0(r r ) , (2)stretch 0
2E p 1.5(r r ) , (3)stretch 0
4. For more information about the use of semi-empirical models in calculating mo-
lecular structure, see Carroll 1998; Carey and Sundberg 2000; Lowry and Richardson
1987.
5. I roughly follow Orzack and Sober (1993) in making the distinction between in-
stantiated and uninstantiated model descriptions. The main difference between our
accounts is that Orzack and Sober treat equations as models, whereas I treat them as
model descriptions. Thus they distinguish between instantiated and uninstantiatedmod-
els, whereas I distinguish between instantiated and uninstantiated model descriptions.
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2E p 2.0(r r ) . (4)stretch 0
Each instantiated description picks out a different model from the ball
and spring family.
3. Precision. Precision is a property of model descriptions, not of models
themselves.6 Theoreticians sometimes talk about models being more or
less precise, but what they usually mean is that some parameter in an
equation is specified more or less precisely. Model builders’ use of the
term “precision” is closely related to the everyday definition “fineness of
specification.”
Comparing the amount of precision in the specification of individual
parameters is relatively straightforward. Compare, for example, the fol-
lowing two instantiations of the ball and spring stretching model:
2E p 1.0 0.1(r r ) , (5)stretch 0
2E p 1.01 0.01(r r ) . (6)stretch 0
The first instantiation (5) is less precise than the second (6). Whereas the
first description picks out all of the models with spring constants between
0.9 and 1.1, the second picks out only those models with spring constants
between 0.99 and 1.01. In other words, the second description picks out
a small subset of the models picked out by the first description.
This example suggests a general method of comparing the precision of
two model descriptions, which will work when the two sets of models
“overlap” as they do in (6) and (5):
A model description is more precise than a model descriptionD1
if picks out a proper subset of the models picked out by .D D D2 1 2
One can add further mathematical sophistication to this relational defi-
nition of precision, but for the purposes of this paper, it will be sufficient
to adopt this simple comparative definition. Giving a more general and
non-relational definition turns out to be complicated and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
I can now be a bit more exact about how I individuate models and
model descriptions. Model descriptions can be uninstantiated or instan-
tiated, while models themselves are determinate sets of relationships be-
6. One might worry that precision is neither a property of models nor model descrip-
tions and argue that it is a property of sets of data. The strict statistical definition of
“precision” does make it a property of data sets. However, there is also a use of the
term “precision” having to do with theoretical representations such as model descrip-
tions. It is this use which I am trying to capture in this paper.
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tween properties. Uninstantiated model descriptions pick out families of
models. If the parameters are set with some imprecision, such that they
can take a range of values, then the description will pick out a subset of
the models picked out by the uninstantiated description. When model
descriptions are instantiated with high degrees of precision, they pick out
smaller sets of models. If we instantiate the parameters with completely
precise values, then the instantiated description will pick out a single
model.
4. Generality. We now turn to generality, which is a property of the re-
lationship between models and target systems. Since I have not given a
full account of this relationship, I will have to rely on an intuitive notion
of “applying to” in order to discuss the tradeoffs involving generality. A
model applies to a target system when it accurately describes the structure
and dynamics of the system according to the standards set by the the
model builder or model user. Although we would need to know more
about a model user’s standards in order to make absolute judgments about
whether a particular model applies to a particular target system, for the
purpose of this paper it will be enough to make comparative judgments
between two sets of models for which the same standards are being
applied.
The term “generality” is often used ambiguously by theoreticians. The
ambiguity consists in two different senses of generality that we might
recognize. One sense of generality has to do with how many actual target
systems a model applies to. The other has to do with how many logically
possible target systems a model applies to. Let us distinguish between
a-generality and p-generality which track these two senses. A-generality
is a measure of the number of actual target systems a particular model
applies to. P-generality is a measure of how many logically possible target
systems a particular model applies to.
5. Tradeoff between Precision and Generality. The easiest way to explain
the relationship between precision and generality is to begin with an in-
tuitive explanation and then develop this explanation in more detail. The
intuitive idea is that when a model description is more precise, it picks
out a smaller set of models. This smaller set of models applies to fewer
target systems. If, on the other hand, the model description is imprecise
in the way it picks out models, then the description will pick out a larger
set of models. Since the set of models is larger, these models will apply
to many more target systems. I think that we can understand the tradeoff
between precision and generality roughly in this way, but to further ar-
ticulate this point, we will have to consider precision’s relationship to
p-generality and a-generality individually.
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5.1. Precision versus P-generality. In order to assess the relationship
between precision and p-generality, let’s consider two instantiations of the
ball and spring model:
2E p 2.0 0.1(r r ) , (7)stretch 0
2E p 2.01 0.01(r r ) . (8)stretch 0
The second instantiation (8) has a greater degree of precision than the
first instantiation (7). Unlike the first instantiation which merely bounds
the spring constant between 1.9 and 2.1, the second instantiationkb
bounds between 2.00 and 2.02. The set of models picked out by thekb
second instantiation is a proper subset of the models picked out by the
first, hence the second is more precise than the first.
Although we cannot say exactly how many logically possible systems
the two sets of models described by (8) and (7) apply to, we can make a
comparison between them. Since the models described by (8) are a proper
subset of the models described by (7), for any logically possible target
system that a model in the (8) family applies to there will also be a model
in the (7) family that applies to the same target system, but not vice versa.
Thus the (7) family is more p-general than the (8) family. Many more
logically possible bond vibrations exhibit the behavior described with a
model picked out by (7) than by (8).
When we put these results together, we can see that there is a tradeoff
between precision and p-generality. As we make model descriptions more
precise, the models that these descriptions pick out will apply to fewer
logically possible target systems. Precision and p-generality cannot be
simultaneously increased. Thus we can conclude that there is a tradeoff
between these two properties.
5.2. Precision versus A-generality. Since it is the world along with our
standards of evaluation that determines the a-generality of a model, one
might be skeptical that there is any universal relationship between pre-
cision and a-generality.
It is worth articulating this criticism in more detail, although I think
it overlooks some important conclusions that we can draw about the
relationship between precision and a-generality. As we have just seen, there
is a tradeoff between precision and p-generality. We know, however, that
all of the actual target systems constitute a very small part of possibility
space. If actual systems are evenly distributed in possibility space, then
the tradeoff between precision and p-generality might also hold for pre-
cision and a-generality automatically. However, we do not have any way
of knowing a priori that systems are distributed relatively evenly in this
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possibility space and hence we have no reason to conclude that precision
trades off against a-generality. Thus the criticism states that the world
will have to tell us in each particular case whether this tradeoff obtains.
It is correct to insist that only the world can tell us how a-general some
model is. However, some facts about the world may help us determine
what kind of relationship can hold between precision and a-generality for
particular types of models.
This point can be illustrated with the help of a vivid example. Imagine
we were building models of ecosystems. Say that we knew the world we
lived in had extremely complex and heterogenous ecosystems, meaning
that many different kinds of ecosystems were found in the world. If this
was true, as we made our model descriptions more precise, they would
pick out a set of models that applied to fewer and fewer target systems.
If the set of ecosystems was fairly homogenous, then a very small set of
models described by very precisely instantiated equations could apply to
many ecosystems.
Say we lived in a desert world, where essentially the same ecosystem
was repeated over and over again. In whatever way we carved up the
world into discrete ecosystems, a very small set of models with a corre-
spondingly precise model description would apply very generally in this
world. On the other hand, in a world of varied and complex ecosystems
like our own, a small set of models described by highly precise equations
will only apply to a small number of ecosystems. Thus one factor that
a-generality depends on is the homogeneity of the set of target system the
model is intended to apply to.
A-generality also depends on a property that I call scope. Scope is
defined as the aspects of target system(s) intended to be represented by
a model. For example, even within models of ecosystems, we might restrict
our scope to the sizes of populations alone. Here we would track intrinsic
growth and death rates, predator-prey interactions, and other factors as-
sociated with the size of particular populations in an ecosystem. For
example, a model with broader scope might include information about
the foraging behavior of particular populations.
From the point of view of a model user with her intended scope, a set
of target systems can appear more or less similar depending on which
factors are actually included in the scope of the model. For example, in
our world, basic physical phenomena such as gravity and electromag-
netism affect objects in the same way everwhere. Even highly specific
models of how these phenomena affect particular kinds of target systems
can have fairly general applicability. On the other hand, target systems
in the world look a lot more heterogenous if a model builder’s scope
includes the kinds of features often of interest to chemists—such as the
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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differences one finds as one moves down a group on the periodic table
or as one starts with methanol and adds CH2’s.
These considerations suggest that in certain cases, where either the
choice of intended target systems or the choice of scope ensures homo-
geneity among target systems, precision does not trade off against
a-generality. Only a very careful investigation of the extent to which dif-
ferent kinds of scopes affect homogeneity among target systems could
determine whether precision trades off against a-generality for a particular
set of target systems. I think that this is an extremely worthwhile project,
but it will require careful empirical study of exactly how complex different
target phenomena in our world really are. Another benefit of this detailed
study is that we could learn the extent to which the tradeoff between
precision and a-generality is a global phenomenon.
Even without this study, however, we can make a weak claim about
the global relationship between precision and a-generality. We can claim
that precision is an attenuating factor of a-generality. By “attenuating
factor,” I mean that increases in precision makes the achievement of
a-generality more difficult, but not impossible.
Many of the issues I discussed in connection with the tradeoff between
precision and a-generality are relevant to this claim about attenuation.
Of particular relevance is the relationship between scope and a-generality.
For any small set of models and set of intended target systems, there is
likely to be some scope that will make this set of models very a-general.
However, it is far more likely that any given scope will result in these
models lacking a-generality. Recall that small sets of models are picked
out by highly precise model descriptions. This means that for many scopes,
highly precise model descriptions will pick out models that lack a-gen-
erality. Thus we can conclude that increasing precision attenuates
a-generality.
6. Generality and Chemical Explanation. We now return to the connection
between qualitative models and chemical explanation. Recall the passage
I quoted from the physical organic chemistry textbook, which suggested
a norm for model building: If you want to generate chemical explanations,
then you should build qualitative models. Since we are only considering
one aspect of qualitative modelling, precision, we could read this norm
as suggesting that one could rationally sacrifice some precision in model
descriptions in order to gain explanatory power. I believe that my analysis
of the tradeoff between precision and a-generality gives us some of the
resources we need to explain this assertion. The key comes from associ-
ating generality with explanatory power.
Many philosophers have thought generality is an important desidera-
tum for scientific explanation. This is true of philosophers who base their
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entire account of explanation on unity and generality (Kitcher 1981; Fried-
man 1974), logical empiricists (Hempel 1965), and some modern causal
theorists (Strevens 2004). I will not defend the connection between ex-
planatory depth and generality in this essay, but I do want to note that
many theorists giving quite different accounts of explanation have seen
generality as an important explanatory desideratum.
There are also reasons internal to chemistry for considering generality
to be an explanatory virtue. Chemists are often interested in trends across
similar but slightly different target systems. For example, chemists might
want to explain the similarities in molecular structure for a set of alcohol
molecules. General models can be used to explain the structure of these
molecules in a unified way, allowing us to make relevant comparisons
between them using the same basic framework. If we build highly precise
models which are not very general, then their explanatory value for com-
paring trends would be lost.
Given that generality is an explanatory virtue in chemistry, we can
justify part of the model building norm defended by Hoffmann, Carroll,
and others. Sacrificing precision typically allows us to gain generality.
This sacrifice is therefore a good way to increase an explanatory virtue,
namely generality. If we have the goal of trying to offer an explanation
of the structure and dynamics of a target system, then it is rational to
idealize by sacrificing precision to gain generality and thereby increase
the explanatory power of our models.
7. Conclusions. In this paper, I have discussed an important component
of modern theoretical chemistry which focuses on the construction of
highly idealized models. Qualitative theory connects the construction and
use of idealized models with an increase in explanatory power. I argued
that precision trades off with p-generality such that one cannot simul-
taneously increase both of these properties. I also argued that precision
attenuates a-generality, meaning that a high degree of precision makes
the achievement of a-generality more difficult. These relationships are
important because they can help us defend a model-building norm that
associates explanatory depth with the sacrifice of precision, an aspect of
qualitative theorizing.
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